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PORTUGUESE EMIGRATION 
AND THE BRAIN DRAIN:
THE POWER OF MOVEMENT 
Michael Gallucci
Introduction
 “The brain drain,” a phrase discussed in 
media articles and research articles alike, is an 
interesting and complex part of Portugal’s past, 
present, and future. Although many nations 
have experienced a brain drain, reports with 
titles such as “Portugal’s Jobless Graduates Flee 
to Africa and Brazil” (Ash), “Portugal’s Brain 
Drain as Graduates Flee Austerity” (Morris et 
al.), and “Will the Portuguese Be Extinct by 
2204?” (Silvestre) are more than enough to 
paint a fearful picture of the subject. Beine 
and colleagues define the brain drain as “the 
international transfer of resources in the form 
of human capital….” (p. 631). The phenomenon 
usually applies to workers with either a high 
skill level or a high education level. The brain 
drain is experienced by almost every nation 
and is especially prevalent in today’s highly 
integrated global network. From the definition 
by Beine and colleagues, it is clear that 
emigration (movement of human capital out of 
a country) is at the heart of the brain drain. One 
of the most interesting facets of emigration is 
its double-edged nature. Many view emigration 
as an opportunity for emigrants to pick up 
new skills and abilities abroad and then apply 
these skills upon returning to their homeland. 
However, if enough emigrants decide not to 
return, the source country will experience a 
permanent deficit in human capital. Depending 
on a country’s size, economic status, and 
myriad other factors, the drain can then 
be viewed as either a gateway to long-term 
growth or a constant deficit that needs to be 
mitigated. Portugal has traditionally benefited 
from emigration since the 1500s, when ships 
from the Portuguese Empire sailed to colonize 
Brazil. However, in recent years emigration 
seems to have become more of a detriment 
than a catalyst for growth in Portugal. From 
2008 to 2012, both the rising unemployment 
rate in Portugal and the rising emigration rate 
reached record numbers. 
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 In this article, I first examine the history 
of emigration from Portugal and show that 
the current emigration trend is similar to a 
dramatic trend observed in Portugal’s past. 
Furthermore, history shows that the likelihood 
that Portuguese emigrants will return, a 
phenomenon known as “circular migration,” 
is low and cannot be relied on as a remedy for 
the emigration losses. Lastly, I analyze the 
present value of the earnings of all high-skilled 
emigrants from Portugal from 2008 to 2012 
and show that, even in the best case scenario, 
Portugal is losing more than €0.9 billion per 
year as a result of emigration.
Portugal: A History of Movement
 The Portuguese people have frequently 
migrated both to and from their home country 
for many years. Serrão (p. 597) believes 
the Portuguese colonization of Madeira in 
1425 sparked the beginnings of a migration 
phenomenon that, despite initially being simply 
a means of territorial expansion, became a way 
of life for the Portuguese people. 
 I now move to the twentieth century and 
examine some of the causes for the migration 
patterns Portugal had experienced during that 
time. The primary reason for twentieth century 
migration was economic, and the Portuguese 
had to frequently search abroad to find work 
and support their families (Solsten, p. 75). 
Baganha’s (1998) analysis of the migratory 
flows to and from Portugal are also based 
on this concept of a migration culture that 
changes according to the demand for labor in 
neighboring countries (p. 189). The relatively 
constant level of emigration between the years 
1950 and 1960 is labelled as [1] in Figure 1. 
This period serves as a useful reference with 
which to compare the two migration periods.
 The mid-to-late 1960s were a tumultuous 
time for both Portugal and its surrounding 
European countries. Labeled as [2] in Figure 
1, one of the largest emigratory spikes in 
Portuguese history occurred during these 
years, with emigration peaking at over 180,000 
in 1970. World War II, which ended in 1945, 
was the catalyst for the Portuguese migration 
levels during those years. The major causes 
for emigration in particular were the policies 
and pushes for Southern Europe to help repair 
the destruction of Northern Europe caused 
by the war. One of the primary policies that 
Figure 1 
Portuguese Emigration between 1950 and 1988
Source: Baganha, 1998, p. 205.
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stimulated Portugal’s labor flow was known 
as the Marshall Plan. This four-year initiative 
gave Europe the necessary capital it needed 
to implement its own economic recovery 
plans. After the Marshall Plan, the European 
Economic Community continued to issue eight 
million work permits among various countries 
from 1958 to 1973 (Baganha, 1998, p. 190). The 
initiative to make up for labor shortages was 
led mainly by France and the Federal Republic 
of Germany (Encyclopedia of the Nations…). 
Even though permits began to be issued in 
1958, Portugal did not participate significantly 
in the European Economic Community’s 
initiative until the early 1960s. The rapid 
increase in emigration during period [2] in 
Figure 1 shows Portugal’s response to the mass 
call for labor in Northern Europe as well as a 
response to the economic boom experienced by 
Europe during this time (Solsten, p. 79).
 This increase in emigration would likely 
have continued after 1970. However, due 
to various political and economic shocks, 
such as the 1973 oil crisis and the loss of 
Portugal’s colonies in Africa, Portuguese 
migration dropped to a fraction of its 1970 
peak in only eight years. The Oil Embargo of 
1973 was a political move during the Arab-
Israeli War in which the nations of OPEC 
imposed an oil embargo on the U.S. as well 
as on other countries that supported Israel. 
This embargo both weakened the economies 
of various European countries and reduced 
job opportunities for foreign workers (Solsten, 
p. 75). After 1974, immigration policies became 
more strict, eventually serving as barriers 
to migration (Baganha et al., p. 419). On the 
international front, the Portuguese Colonial 
War ended in 1974, and as a result Portugal lost 
control of its colonies in Africa. In 1975, more 
than 700,000 Portuguese colonials returned to 
Portugal (Encyclopedia of the Nations…). In 
the span of three years, Portugal lost both of 
its major national and international means of 
migration. Period [3] in Figure 1 shows that 
emigration dropped from 120,000 to 30,000 in 
just three years.
 After 1978 emigration dropped to around 
20,000 per year and remained under that level 
for most of the 1980s.1 However, starting in 
2011, emigration spiked to a level greater than 
anything recorded since 1970. Data gathered 
from the National Institute of Statistics (Figure 
2) show that more than 100,000 people left 
Portugal in each of the years 2011 and 2012. 
Figure 2 
Portuguese Emigration from 2008 to 2012
Source: National Institute of Statistics.
 1I could not find any data for emigration from 1990 
to 2000 in the major migration databases, which made 
it difficult to study. Pordata Statistics Database began 
displaying migration data from 2000 onwards, but the 
emigration spike did not begin until 2008 (see Figure 2). 
Therefore, 1990–2007 is not discussed in this article.
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 This rise in emigration seems to match 
the rise in emigration that occurred in period 
[2], and, if the level continues to increase, 
Portugal can expect even more emigrants 
in the coming years. Does the fact that more 
people each year are emigrating predict a 
grim future for Portugal? Or is it simply 
a cyclical phenomenon that will have no 
long-term effects on the country? To answer 
these questions, I analyze the likelihood that 
emigrants will return to Portugal, followed by 
a quantitative analysis of the economic losses 
resulting from Portugal’s skilled emigration.
Cyclical Migration
 The notion that a group of people will 
return to their home country a few years after 
emigrating is known as cyclical migration. 
Although emigration to both the Americas 
and to Portugal’s colonies in the years before 
1974 was largely permanent (Mendonsa, 
p. 2), Portugal’s workers have migrated to and 
from various countries in Europe for much of 
its history. For example, circular migration 
could be observed in the community of Nazaré, 
which sits north of Lisbon, for many years. 
Eugene Mendonsa, a Ph.D. graduate from 
the University of Cambridge with a focus in 
social anthropology, investigates the observed 
benefits of cyclical migration using Nazaré 
as a focal point for his research. In 1973, 5% 
of Portugal’s total emigrant population came 
from Nazaré (Keefe, pp. 86–103). During the 
winter, the fishermen would leave Portugal 
to seek maritime employment and return to 
Nazaré in the summer when Portugal’s oceans 
were more profitable (Mendonsa, p. 2). 
 The conclusion I draw from the case of 
Nazaré is that circular migration can provide 
many benefits to the economy when the return 
migration rate is high. For example, Mendonsa 
shows that 88% of migrating Portuguese from 
Nazaré own “productive capital” (this is capital 
such as a store, a van, or other materials to help 
build a business). Conversely, only 38% of non-
migrants were reported to own such capital. 
Additionally, emigrants usually experience 
higher income levels and savings than non-
emigrants. These benefits only occur, however, 
if enough migrate back to Portugal. Although 
many of Nazaré’s residents successfully engaged 
in cyclical migration, I show that a majority of 
Portugal’s emigrants are not likely to return to 
Portugal. I study France and Germany, the two 
largest destinations for Portuguese emigration 
in the late 1900s (Baganha, 1994) and use 
Figure 3 
Destination of Portuguese Emigrants from 1950 to 1988
Source: Baganha, 1994, p. 23.
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the observed trends within those countries as 
support for this assertion.2
 Figure 3 shows data for the (European) 
destinations of all recorded Portuguese 
emigrants between the years 1950 and 1988. 
From the mid-1960s to the 1970s, a large 
percentage of Portuguese emigrants chose 
France as their destination. By taking all the 
emigrants between 1960 and 1975 in Figure 
3, I calculate that Portuguese emigration to 
France comprised 80% of total Portuguese 
emigration in Europe during that time. I 
undertake the same analysis for Germany and 
find that it was the destination country for 17% 
of all Portuguese emigrants during those same 
years. This makes the Portuguese populations 
in both France and Germany a good sample for 
studying the general behavior of Portuguese 
emigrants.
 Figure 3 is crucial to my argument for 
circular migration because it shows not only 
the destinations of intra-European emigration 
but also the magnitude of emigration. As in 
Figure 1, there is a large spike of emigrants 
from 1960 to 1975. These levels are extremely 
large, reaching 160,000 people in 1970. Before 
and after this time period, an appreciable 
number of emigrants are seen in neither France 
nor Germany. If the majority of Portuguese 
practiced circular migration, I would expect 
to see a large number of people leave France 
and Germany to return to Portugal 5 to 15 
years after the emigration spike previously 
described. With the help of various databanks 
and publications on foreign-born populations 
within Europe, I can track the number of 
Portuguese-born citizens in both countries 
over time. If there is not a substantial number 
of Portuguese leaving either of those countries 
in the years following the massive influx of 
the 1970s, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the majority of Portuguese permanently 
emigrated. 
 Records show that the number of 
Portuguese who lived in France in the 
years 1975, 1982, and 1990 were 759,000, 
767,000, and 649,000, respectively (“Trends 
in International Migration,” p. 193). From 
these numbers, I gather that in 15 years the 
total number of native-born Portuguese in 
France drops by only about 110,000. To put 
this in perspective, the combined number of 
Portuguese emigrants to France from 1965 to 
1973 (8 years) is approximately 735,000. If the 
rate of return to Portugal were high, I should 
see a higher percentage change over such a 
long time period, especially since there was 
almost no migration observed after the spike. 
This indicates that a large majority of these 
people settled in France permanently. 
 I performed a similar analysis for 
Germany. Data (also taken from “Trends in 
International Migration”) for Germany as the 
target country for Portuguese emigrants can be 
seen in Figure 43: the number of Portuguese-
born citizens in Germany drops only about 
30% between 1982 and 1988. Because of the 
low levels of Portuguese migration from 
both France and Germany, I conclude that a 
majority of the Portuguese emigrants have 
little intention of returning to their home 
country.
 These studies of France and Germany 
show that Portugal’s emigrants have 
historically not been likely to return within 
a decade after migration. Why is this? And 
is there anything that suggests that today’s 
emigrants will behave in the same way? The 
Focus Migration Database gives a detailed 
profile of the immigration history of France, 
and it emphasizes that most of the Portuguese 
emigrants in France persuaded their families 
to join them instead of returning to Portugal. 
Quite simply, it was not worth the risk to 
go back when the emigrants already had 
job opportunities in their new homes. The 
Portuguese are shown to have a high aversion 
to risk-taking (Burton); and the data from both 
France and Germany confirm that if the job 
market in Portugal is poor, then emigrants will 
elect to stay in their current positions rather 
than risk returning to Portugal and not finding 
work. With an overall unemployment rate of 
 2In this article I deal only with reported emigration 
and immigration. It is almost certain that a large number 
of emigrants were unreported in the statistics. Between 
1950 and 1988, approximately 777,000 Portuguese 
appeared in France and Germany who were not counted 
in the Portuguese statistics (Baganha et al., p. 7). It is, 
therefore, wise to view all data as underestimates.
 3Data for Germany were not available in “Trends in 
International Migration” any time before 1980, so only the 
years 1980 to 1992 were taken into account.
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16.2% (Pordata…) and a youth unemployment 
rate of 34.9% (YCharts) in 2012, the scenario 
that most Portuguese emigrants will return to 
Portugal after working abroad does not seem a 
likely one.
 In moderation, emigration can be a 
powerful means for increasing a country’s 
human capital in terms of work experience, 
GDP contribution, and savings. However, 
problems occur when the emigrants fail to 
return to their home country. As shown by past 
data, a majority of Portuguese emigrants did 
not return to Portugal. 
Analyzing Economic Losses as a 
Result of Emigration
 The goal of this section is to examine the 
economic losses to Portugal from emigration. 
In order to find these answers from the 
wealth of research on the brain drain, it is 
imperative to identify the best way to analyze 
the Portuguese emigration data available. 
Articles published in the 1960s had taken a 
relatively optimistic stance concerning the 
brain drain, arguing that although the home 
country suffers from emigration in the short 
run, it would experience relatively small long-
term losses (Grubel and Scott, p. 274). For 
example, Berry and Soligo (1969) analyzed 
capital owned by emigrants and concluded that 
emigration will only cause an economic loss 
to the remaining population if the emigrants 
have either high ownership of capital stock or 
high wealth-holding propensities (Berry and 
Soligo, p. 792). Others have concluded that the 
average product of labor and per capita income 
will fall as a result of emigration of educated 
labor (Bhagwati and Hamada, p. 41). Many 
of these studies observe general emigration 
trends across a large number of countries and 
do not analyze any one country in isolation. I 
focus on the economic losses that result from 
Portuguese emigration. In particular, I estimate 
the losses that Portugal is experiencing due 
to emigration of highly skilled workers. The 
aim is to calculate the total present value of 
the wages of all highly skilled workers leaving 
Portugal. If I assume that no emigrants from 
Portugal will return, then that means Portugal 
loses their economic contribution not only 
for the year they left but also for every year 
afterwards until they would have been expected 
to stop working. Equation 1, a variant of the 
equation applied in economics to calculate 
the present value of an annuity (Investopedia), 
Figure 4
Native-Born Portuguese in Germany (1981–1991)
Source: “Trends in International Migration,” p. 194.
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is used for this purpose. The equation can be 
used in combination with migration data to 
find the total losses (present and future) that 
Portugal is incurring as a result of permanent 
emigration.
 
 In equation 1, W is the yearly wage 
of the worker and Re is the average level of 
remittances sent home per year. Re represents 
money that gets sent back to Portugal and 
thus does not count as an economic loss. The 
variables, g and d, are the average annual 
growth rate of the wage and the discount (or 
interest) rate, respectively. The wage growth 
rate was calculated from the average wage level 
of highly skilled workers from Pordata and 
found to be 2.1% per year. Also from Pordata, 
the average interest rate for individual loans 
from the years 2008 to 2012 is 5.7%. Lastly, n 
is the number of years an emigrant is expected 
to work, which I have assumed to be 40 years. 
 Equation 1 expresses the present value of 
earnings for only one emigrant, so I expand this 
to account for all emigrants leaving Portugal. 
It is also important to realize that some 
emigrants who left Portugal would not have 
found jobs. Therefore, I cannot assume that 
every emigrant would be employed and thus 
represent losses that Portugal is experiencing. 
Correcting for both of these is a relatively 
simple task and can be done by multiplying 
equation 1 by both the employment rate and 
the number of emigrants leaving Portugal in 
that year. Therefore, the total losses in one year 
can be estimated from equation 2:
 
Here, U is the unemployment rate for a given 
year and Em is the number of highly skilled 
emigrants for that year. This equation yields the 
net present value of all highly skilled workers 
who are leaving Portugal from the year they 
leave until they are expected to retire.4
 Equations 1 and 2 include a total of four 
variables that require Portuguese data. The 
variable names, symbols, and method of data 
collection are as follows (see Appendix): 
1) Wage (W)–Ideally, I would like to 
get data for the wages of Portuguese 
highly skilled workers when they 
begin work in their host country. I 
assume these emigrants are younger 
and will remain in the workforce for 
40 years. As a consequence, using a 
mid-career wage would result in an 
overestimate of the losses. However, 
Statistics Portugal, the Portuguese 
center for statistical information, 
did not have the average wages of 
Portuguese highly skilled workers for 
different age groups in its database. 
Instead, I use two different data sets to 
provide both high and low estimates 
for wages. I decided to use statistics 
concerning Portuguese college 
graduates as a proxy for highly skilled 
workers. The average wages for all 
Portuguese with a bachelor’s degree 
provide a high estimate for the wages 
that emigrants would receive, since 
these averages include workers who 
have been in the labor force for a 
longer period of time than the typical 
emigrant. I also use the average wages 
for Portuguese workers between 25 
and 34 years old as the low estimate. 
Both data sets were found in Statistics 
Portugal.
2) Remittance level (Re)–This is 
calculated by dividing the yearly 
amount of remittances by the number 
of Portuguese emigrants (Pordata…).
3) Unemployment rate (U)–Once again, 
unemployment data for highly skilled 
workers are difficult to find. Therefore, 
I use college graduates as a proxy 
here as well. I use the reported yearly 
unemployment rate for Portuguese 
citizens who have a college degree 
(Pordata…).
4) Emigration level of all the high-
skilled workers (Em)–I also cannot 
specify this variable directly. I did 
not find data reporting emigration 
 4It is important to note that this equation does 
not account for illegal emigrants. Additionally, it only 
takes into account highly skilled emigrants. The results, 
therefore, are a largely conservative estimate.
(Eq. 1)
(Eq. 2)
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levels sorted by the skill level of the 
emigrant. However, I can estimate 
this value by once again using college 
graduates as a proxy for the highly 
skilled worker population. Data taken 
from the 2010–2011 (most recent) 
edition of the OECD migration data 
bank (OECD) give a sample set of 
Portuguese emigrants from those 
years, along with their education level 
and age. From these data, I estimate 
that 30% of Portuguese emigrants 
aged 15 to 34 years old possess 
a college degree. I then take the 
permanent emigration level from that 
age bracket (Pordata…) and multiply 
it by 0.3 to come up with an estimate 
for the emigration level of highly 
skilled workers in Portugal.
Results
 Due to the limited availability of some of 
the data, I only estimate the losses from 2008 
to 2012. Additionally, I only take into account 
permanent emigrants. It is therefore likely 
that, because I have not considered the entire 
emigrating population or any undocumented 
workers, the actual value of economic losses is 
higher than what is reported in this article. The 
results of estimating Equation 2 are shown in 
Table 1.
 Table 1 shows the value of economic 
losses (the direct application of Equation 2) 
and economic losses as a percentage of total 
capital wealth for the two different wage level 
estimates of the Portuguese workers. The total 
capital wealth was taken from The World Bank 
(p. 162) and includes both human and natural 
capital in its estimate. 
 Table 1 shows the total losses that 
Portugal is experiencing from the emigration 
of these workers, which grows from €0.92 to 
€1.39 billion in 2008 to €2.1 to €3.14 billion 
in 2012. Furthermore, in 2012 the losses 
calculated range from 0.90% to 1.35% of 
Portugal’s total capital wealth for that year. 
Should We Care?
 It is clear from this analysis that small 
losses generated by a large number of people 
can have a substantial effect on the economic 
losses of Portugal. However, reversing these 
effects can (in theory) be surprisingly easy. I 
can take the present-value calculations from 
2012 and show that if only 5,000 fewer people 
had emigrated, then Portugal’s losses would 
decline by €1 billion in both the high wage and 
low wage scenarios. Given these numbers and 
the fact that my calculations underestimate 
the real losses due to emigration, additional 
government spending on infrastructure and 
programs to help decrease emigration could 
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Table 1 
Results of Applying Equation 2 to Migration Data 
 Low Income Estimate High Income Estimate 
Year 
Losses          
(Billion €) 
Losses as % of Total
Capital Wealth 
Losses          
(Billion €)  
2008 0.92 0.42 1.39 0.63 
2009 0.77 0.36 1.17 0.55 
2010 1.11 0.52 1.60 0.75 
2011 1.63 0.79 2.00 0.97 
2012 2.10 0.90 3.14 1.35 
 Source: The World Bank, p. 162 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Losses as % of Total
Capital Wealth
Source: The World Bank, p. 162.
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prove beneficial to Portugal in the long term.
 One additional point that should be 
considered is the effect that having more 
Portuguese remain in the country would 
have on the tax dollars collected by the 
government. For the income levels that I 
have used in this calculation, the income tax 
rate as reported by the Portuguese Personal 
Income Tax Code is 28.5% (KPMG Portuguese 
Tax Code). This means that if I assume that, 
once again, 5,000 people had decided to stay 
in Portugal, the government would collect 
an additional €2 million in income taxes per 
year (assuming that the 5,000 people were 
all employed). And if Portugal were then 
to invest more money in infrastructure to 
create jobs, the cost of the projects would 
be greatly mitigated by the extra tax dollars 
collected from the public.
 Unfortunately, a subject such as 
emigration is complicated, and it would be 
naïve to think that a simple solution exists. The 
high unemployment rate for college graduates 
in Portugal is one of the chief reasons that 
there are so many emigrants (Pordata…). 
Another factor that may be hindering the 
creation of jobs and opportunities for these 
young graduates is a cultural sense of risk 
aversion, discouraging them from creating new 
opportunities in Portugal and instead using the 
European Union’s liberal emigration policies 
to find opportunities elsewhere. Regardless of 
the reason, the brain drain is a phenomenon 
often talked about but rarely quantified. 
Certainly more research should be undertaken 
on this phenomenon, and various reforms and 
incentives should be considered to help curb 
the rising emigration rate in Portugal.
21 
 
Appendix 
Data and Results for Equation 2 
Low Wage Estimate 
Year Emigrants Average Yearly 
Wage (€) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Remittances per 
Emigrant (€) 
Total Losses 
(Billion €) 
2008 4,243 11,148 0.07 2.33 0.92 
2009 3,523 11,249 0.06 2.21 0.77 
2010 4,952 11,595 0.07 2.35 1.11 
2011 6,205 13,871 0.09 2.43 1.63 
2012 9,944 11,453 0.12 2.70 2.10 
 
High Wage Estimate 
Year Emigrants Average Yearly 
Wage (€) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Remittances per 
Emigrant (€) 
Total Losses 
(Billion €) 
2008 4,243 16,898 0.07 2.33 1.39 
2009 3,523 17,040 0.06 2.21 1.17 
2010 4,952 16,730 0.07 2.35 1.60 
2011 6,205 17,040 0.09 2.43 2.00 
2012 9,944 17,138 0.12 2.70 3.14 
Sources: OECD.Stat; Pordata. 
 
Source: OECD. Stat; Pordata...
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